Pluralism

Contemporary societies contain people with a variety of identities, ethnicities, beliefs, values, family and social customs and ways of relating to others. This blog outlines the challenge this pluralism presents to constitutional democracies

Defining pluralism
 
There are four different aspects of any definition of pluralism. First, it refers to the variety of values and social ties of belief, ethnicity and culture to be found in contemporary societies.
 
Secondly, it refers to the variety of identities to be found in contemporary societies. Some identities are those we choose or construct for ourselves. Other are ascribed to us by others. Identity is not a singular quality but usually people have multiple identities. For example, we identify as American, Christian, inherit immigrant family values and retain ties to the country of origin or identify as British and Hindu or Muslim. Varieties in beliefs, values and cultures are twinned with varieties in identity.
 
Thirdly, pluralism refers to the possibility, or likelihood, that people will give different interpretations to the same general values. For example, there is a long tradition going way back in history and reflected in modern times in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights of the importance of ‘dignity’. But at the same time people will define the component values necessary for a person’s ‘dignity’ to be respected in different ways. Patriarchy is given greater respect in some cultures than others.
 
Fourthly, there is the positive value that can be ascribed to pluralism. For example, a society that is able to successfully develop a pluralist culture may be viewed as normatively ‘better’ than one that is a monoculture or insists on the supremacy of one particular belief system or religion or ethnicity. A pluralist society may also be seen as more adaptable and likely to be better able to withstand shocks and challenges than a monoculture.
 
All constitutionalist or democratic rule-based systems of government face challenges in addressing these different faces of pluralism. The starting principle is that people should be treated as having equal worth. Even if within democracies this starting point is generally agreed, the practice is a challenge.
 
The constitutional setting
 
Equality under the law
 
The starting point that everyone is to be treated as possessing equal worth finds its practical expression in democracies in the principle that everyone is equal under the law. It is easily stated but not always applied. Neither securities law nor anti-trust law appears to be evenly applied in the US to Tech billionaires or to their companies. The weaponizing of the law against the opponents of President Trump is a clear case of unequal use of the law.
 
Providing space
 
Historically, differences in identity in constitutional democracies have been accommodated through federal or other systems of devolved powers. Space defined by geography remains important as a means of accommodating difference. At the same time, it has its own problems with its own minorities within the same geographical space. Space defined in terms of allowing for differences within shared geographical space such as urban areas has become more important. Within shared spaces the way in which diversity is reflected in education, labour markets, housing, business and administrative structures becomes the crucial dimension of providing ‘space’. Providing space is not problem free. While the streaming of schools by ethnicity or belief may be reassuring for families and their children it may come at the cost of developing intercultural ties.
 
The US Supreme Court decision in 2026 regarding the 1965 Voting Rights Act and disallowing special treatment for minorities in Louisiana voting districts is an indicator of how contentious it is to treat diversity through geography. The US Supreme Court decision of 2023 barring race as an admission criterion in US universities is an indicator of how contentious it is to treat diversity by offering space not attached to geography.
 
Representation
 
Historically, democracies provide for the expression of diversity through representative systems of government. The elected representative can act on behalf of their constituencies taking account, not only their direct interests and values, but also broader societal interests and values. In the same way that concepts of allowing ‘space’ have had to evolve so too does the approach to representation. Instead of viewing representation in terms of simply acting on behalf of others, the need for representation to mirror the composition of society has become more important. 
 
Although electorates hope that their elected representative will mirror their own sense of identity, interests and viewpoints, the everyday point of contact for the individual with their system of government is typically at the receiving end of a long chain of intermediaries delivering services in areas such as health and education. Such intermediaries reflect an uneasy mix of central government bureaucracies reaching out, expert bodies reaching in and citizens reaching up. The need to provide for the diversity of society in chains of intermediation adds another dimension. The US currently shows the difficulty of allowing for the expression of different values in the context of the health delivery chain where the role of experts is under attack and different values contend in relation to women’s reproductive choices.
 
Rights
 
Declarations of rights have historically provided an important defence for the expression of diversity in allowing for freedom of expression and association. In recent times the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) contains a number of provisions protecting diversity. For example, Article 21 on non-discrimination states that:
 
‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’.
 
In addition, Article 22 states that:
 
‘The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’ and Article 23 that ‘Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay’.
 
The difficulty with such sweeping declarations of norms is that they reach into areas of deep dispute about values where the application of the law and politics are intermingled. In the UK political sensitivities around ethnicity is said to influence the application of the law (for example in relation to crimes against women). In such cases the fear is that the law is not applied because of political sensitivities around ethnicity. At the same time, in the UK there is some political support to reduce legalisation through withdrawal from the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and its Court. Debates about ‘affirmative action’ in the US suggest that there are no clear or settled boundaries between the role of the law and the role of politics and no clear and lasting resolution under either. Rather than relying on extensive declarations of rights it might be better for democratic systems to be seen as learning systems and benefit from what JS Mill called their own ‘experiments in living’.
 
Constitutional values
 
One of the underlying difficulties in respecting pluralism in democratic societies is that supporting values are difficult to constitutionalise. These values include tolerance, a willingness to accommodate others in rules of recognition and moderation in the expression of difference. The EU’s 2012 Treaty on European Union attempts to constitutionalise them in Article 2. Article 2 states that:
 
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’.
 
The problem is that democratic virtues such as tolerance are about social and political practices and are difficult to entrench in a rule-based form. There is an inner tension with declaration of rights. Tolerance, moderation and accommodation are values that arguably ‘trump’ declarations of rights in part because they allow for the expression of different interpretations of values and in part because they are practices without which rule based democracies cannot get off the starting line.
 
Virtues such as tolerance, moderation and accommodation recognise different values and identities without necessarily conveying approval for particular values. At the same time, they are not simply defensive values to stop divisions pulling a political association apart. They can also be interpreted to convey the message that diversity itself is a good thing and something to be embraced as a positive virtue. Arguably the positive approval of diversity is where contemporary democracies need to head. Businesses recognise diverse workforces and management structures as adding strength and resilience to their endeavours, so too do administrative bodies. Politicians need to step up to the plate. Again, the positive embrace of intercultural relations is difficult to express in constitutional terms.
 
Conclusions
 
Pluralism in contemporary democratic societies is both an inescapable fact and a value that needs to be embraced. It is difficult to constitutionalise but should change the way we look on representation and on the way we look at the role of law in the form of declarations of rights.