​What’s Wrong with Functionalism?

‘Functionalism’ can be defined as a theory of government that gives priority to the functional tasks of government and where institutional structures are adopted and appraised by how well they support the functional objectives chosen. The system of government is judged according to the results it brings. If the results are ‘good’ measured against the tasks to be carried out then the expectation is that the system will win public acceptance. With public acceptance further functional objectives can be added

Functionalism came into prominence following World War II. On a global scale, there was a desire for a system for making international rules that would command support across the world. In Europe there was a desire to build a structure across countries that would get away from the kind of national rivalries that led to two world wars. In Europe, functionalism is associated with Monnet and the approach of building a European union in task-specific steps, starting with the coal and steel community. In international rulemaking it is associated with the theorising of David Mitrany and the practical difficulties facing US leadership in the postwar setting. Rather than get bogged down on normative discussions about the structure of the international order it seemed best to focus on specific tasks.
 
Common to both settings was a desire to avoid normative questions around the structure of government. It would have been difficult and probably impossible for the member states of the UN to agree on a democratic structure for international rulemaking. Similarly, it would have been difficult if not impossible for Europe’s nation states to agree on a democratic structure for a European union. The UN system essentially revolved around the power structure reflected in the permanent membership of the Security Council. The veto power given to the US was essential for Congressional approval and to avoid the failure of the US to ratify its membership in the prewar League of Nations. In Europe, Monnet wanted to avoid premature and potentially divisive debate about what shape an eventual European union might take.
 
Each approach can be viewed as a qualified success. In Europe Intergovernmentalism and the assertion of national identities remain obstacles on the path to a federal future and functionalism remains alive as a way to thread the needle on the way to ever closer union. Along the way, purely functional aims can be weighed in the light of intergovernmental relations and the need to trade-off and balance national interests. The Draghi report (9 sept 24) is the latest example. On the global scene a Third World War has been averted for now despite great power rivalries and the need to update the permanent membership of the Security Council. Nevertheless, there is an instability and tensions around governing structures in both settings.
 
What’s wrong?
 
Despite the qualified successes of functionalism in Europe and on the global scene there are three main weaknesses that do not dissipate with time. The first is that institutions entrench their own power and become an obstacle to what may be better governing arrangements. ‘Better’ in this context means better from both a functional viewpoint and a normative perspective.
 
Secondly, and relatedly, the institutions may choose new functional tasks that enhance their own position but may exclude alternative policy options. For example, the Draghi report explores new tasks for the EU and its institutions to pursue collectively to raise productivity in the EU and consistent with increasing the powers of the institutions themselves. But the report does not explore an alternative future for the EU as a low cost centre on the global scene and with less need for interventions by the Brussels institutions.
 
Thirdly, functionalism deliberately deferred for the future potentially divisive normative questions about the structure of government and deferment continues. Eventually, deferment becomes a source of weakness. The acceptance of authority is not the same as consent to a system of government.
 
Does it matter?
 
There is a case for saying that these flaws in the functionalist approach are of secondary importance. Normative reservations have been addressed in the case of both the European and global settings by the means of declarations of fundamental rights that provide a form of legitimacy to what is done and help to steer the direction of both European and global policymaking. Moreover, whatever the weaknesses and misdirection in its policy making the EU continues to move towards an ever-closer union. There is a case for saying that the UN should focus even more on practical and functional tasks rather than on its role as the world’s preeminent forum for grandstanding on principles. Nevertheless there are limits to functionalism that need to be recognised.
 
Limits?
 
Results
The first limit to functionalism is that results-based justifications of a functionalist task-based form of government fail to distinguish between authoritarian means of the achievement of results and democratic means. Democratic regimes have to achieve general acceptance for what they do. Otherwise, the system itself will lack support and be questioned. But a focus simply on results is not enough. Above all it is the hallmark of authoritarian regimes.
 
The cost of diverting attention from structures
A second limitation of functionalism is that by diverting attention from structures it may damage the attainment of tasks as well as disguise differences between authoritarian methods of government and democratic means.
 
The main illustration is global government itself. Full multilateral rulemaking has broken down because of the tension between authoritarian regimes and those that are broadly democratic. To avoid impasse, large objectives have to be decomposed into smaller objectives. Fully multilateral agreements have to be replaced by agreement among smaller groups of like-minded countries and gradually extended by buy-ins from other countries.
 
A third limitation of functionalism is that questions around the legitimacy of structures and instantons can’t be delayed indefinitely. Legitimacy depends on the possibility to express consent to the system and what is done under it. Consent is a more demanding criterion than acceptance. In the absence of consent there will be adverse reactions to the system. Some of the backsliding to be seen in Europe and elsewhere does not just have domestic national roots but is also an expression of dissent to the system of government that needs to be heeded.