The Many Faces of ‘Identity’ Politics

Confidence in democratic governments is not high. One possible explanation lies in the perceived growth of what is called ‘identity politics’. This blog looks at the possible connection in the light of the many different dimensions of identity.

Identity and confidence in democracies
 
Surveys of opinion across democracies in the OECD area suggest that only about half of the population has confidence in their governments.
 
The assertion that the growth of ‘identity’ politics plays a large part in this lack of confidence appeals to two main features. First, the changes in the different aspects of identity may weaken the social consensus on the background norms of behaviour that underpin how democracies work. Secondly, the aggregation of views across the span of political preferences is seen to have become more difficult and undercuts confidence in what governments actually do.
 
Democratic norms and confidence in how things work
 
Democracies depend on everyone accepting certain norms of behaviour. People need to accept a social obligation to vote even though their own single vote will have no effect on results. They need to accept a situation where their own party might lose and look to the next time to try again. Those who occupy positions of authority through elections need to operate within the political rules, both written and unwritten. There appears to have been a weakening of these background norms in many democracies. Changes in identity seem to lie behind this weakening. 
 
The changes in senses of identity that seem particularly relevant are the rise in importance of personal values alongside the broader values we identify with; a greater reliance on values we project onto others, and a weakening of the sense of identification with elected representatives. 
 
The values we identify with
 
The values people identify with may comprise a broad set of connected values. For example, the value we attach to the preservation of species, or forests, may be connected to broader environmental values about the need to mitigate climate change. Conversely, we may identify with specific values, for example with the need to combat discrimination in education. Similarly, identification may be with values that are widely shared, such as the need for all people to be treated fairly, and those that are highly personal, such as attitudes towards sexual orientation or gender. A growth in identification with highly personal values may come at the expense of broader values more likely to be shared by others.
 
Projected identity
 
Our personal sense of identity, or the sense of identity we feel with those with whom we associate, may not be seen in the same way by others. In particular an outside observer may have prior beliefs about a person or a group that is projected onto them. These beliefs colour perceptions and encourage a bias towards evidence that confirms those prior beliefs and towards ignoring any contradictory evidence. A greater reliance on prior beliefs about others and values we project onto others is one response to navigating amid the heterogeneity of modern societies. It is a shortcut that comes at the expense of understanding and reduces the sense of the social sharing of norms.
 
Representatives we identify with
 
Political parties are the main vehicle for the selection of candidates for political office and for representing voters in elected assemblies. When ‘our’ party wins a seat, or forms a group in an elected assembly, we expect to be able to identify with our representatives in some way. We do not expect our representatives to reflect an exact mirror image of us and our associates, but neither do we want there to be too great a distance. We want them to be able to identify with what we ourselves wish to see come out of politics. We may reasonably doubt this identification if the representatives are very different from ourselves. 
 
If values we hold important are not being given the attention we feel they deserve, if we rely on short cut beliefs about the society we live in, and if we don’t see elected representatives representing what we ourselves want out of politics then respect for the conventions of democratic behaviour will weaken. Attacks on the Washington ‘swamp’ reflect feelings of disjuncture in representation and values and is itself an example of projecting an identity with divisive impact. Former President Trump pandered to this disjuncture and attacked democratic norms by violating the conventions of the constitution, denying his election loss, and stacking the Supreme Court with political appointees. 
 
At the same time as democratic norms may be losing their binding power, democratic politics may also be losing its ability to aggregate public opinion across educational and occupational divides, across income and wealth differences and across different ethnic and religious groupings. This weakening erodes confidence in what actually gets done in democratic politics.
 
Aggregating the span of views and confidence in what gets done
 
Democratic elections give everyone the chance to express their views and to vote and thus offer the widest span of information about preferences across society. Political parties aggregate this information either in governing coalitions or in a single party government. The preferences of those represented by the parties in government will be reflected only imperfectly in actual policy decisions, but all parties know that if they ignore the views of the public, they are likely to be punished at the next election. One interpretation of the growth of identity politics is that this process of aggregation has become much more difficult. This makes it more difficult for governments to make policy decisions, more difficult for people to see governments as responsive to what they want, and generally reduces confidence in what they do.
 
Personal identity
 
A starting point for thinking about aggregation is in terms of peoples’ own sense of personal identity. Traditionally, this might have been felt in the rather simple terms of gender, profession, family status and role, nationality and religion. In today’s world these simplicities have vanished. People have a sense of multiple identities – for example an international and regional identity as well as national and local, a more fluid sense of gender, a portfolio of activities, more loosely connected family structures and roles, while traditional belief categories may have started to dissolve, or be replaced by environmentalist beliefs. 
 
Associational identity
 
A second aspect of identity in relation to aggregation is associational and is about people and groups we identify with. The identity we feel with associates has also undergone a transformation. Professional association remains important and membership in ethnic, faith or environmentalist groups are also important. But, association, once largely defined by geographical location, is now limited only by how far we wish to connect, or not, through social media. There is a tension between geographical sorting and social media sorting.
                        
Political values we identify with
 
Political values are one particular class of values that people may identify with. Traditionally this form of identification has been viewed along a right/left spectrum. However, we are aware that in order for our individual vote to count we need to associate it with the votes of others who are like-minded. In today’s more diversified social groupings, like-mindedness may not be expressed in left/right terms. Moreover, our political values are not necessarily consistent. We might want more social spending on top of existing public spending commitments but, at the same time, oppose raising the limits on government spending and borrowing.
 
Parties we identify with
 
Traditionally, the sense of association with others along a spectrum of political values has been reflected by identifying with a political party whose policy platform we broadly align with. The main parties offer a set of related values and a ready-made vehicle for association. Our political preferences are usually regarded as fixed. If parties wish to get support, then they will have to offer policies we can go along with and reflect the preferences of the part of the electorate to which they want to appeal. If their policy offerings do not resonate with the voters they wish to reach, then they will need to change party policy. 
 
The difficulties
 
The difficulties of aggregation reflect each of these senses of identity. First a greater diversity in personal identities makes it less easy for political parties to target their potential supporters and to tailor their party offerings to the targets. Secondly, less geographically rooted associational identities also makes targeting more difficult. Political parties may also have difficulties in reaching into the new forms of social association that may not fit along a traditional left/right continuum and that may reflect inconsistent political values. 
 
Traditionally parties have overcome the difficulties of targeting by offering broad platforms. But broad platforms tend not to resonate with those for whom personal values are important and whose associations do not fit easily within a right /left continuum. The difficulties of aggregation result in governments appealing just to their core support. This is further divisive and also leaves those outside the core lacking trust in what governments do, allegedly in their name.
 
Other causes behind loss in confidence
 
Low levels of confidence in democratic governments cannot just be attributed to the perceived growth of identity politics. For example, when we criticise the shortcomings in what governments do, we need to recognise that governments have become increasingly dependent on experts and expertise situated outside electoral politics. Poor policymaking and loss of confidence in what governments do may reflect the fact that the two are often poorly combined and brought together. However, identity politics permeates the media and may have a greater influence on the erosion of democratic norms and confidence in how democracies work.